1. When all the inhabitants of a courtyard, with one exception, have established an eruv, this individual [causes carrying] to be forbidden.¹Rather than consider a courtyard as being divided into small portions belonging to each of the homeowners, we consider the entire courtyard to be the joint property of all the inhabitants. Therefore, if one of them does not participate in the eruv, it is forbidden to carry within the courtyard as a whole.

It must be emphasized that this halachah and those that follow apply only in a situation where the person establishing the eruv did not grant all other inhabitants in the city, lane, or courtyard a share, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 20. Today, this granting of a share is standard practice, and so it is unlikely that such situations would arise. [This rule applies regardless of whether the person failed to join the eruv] because of a willful decision²Eruvin 6:3, the source for this halachah, mentions only an accidental oversight. The consensus is that according to the development of the concept in the Gemara, the same rules apply regarding a willful decision. or because of an oversight. [In such a situation,] it is forbidden for all the inhabitants to transfer articles from their homes to the courtyard or from the courtyard to their homes.

Should the person who did not join in the eruv subordinate³The subordination (ביטול in Hebrew) of the ownership of one's domain is a halachic institution devised by our Sages for situations of this nature. It gives the others the formal rights of ownership. After the person has subordinated his ownership, there no longer exists a person with a share in the courtyard who is not participating in the eruv. the ownership of merely [his share] of the courtyard [to the others],⁴Rashi and Rabbenu Asher (Eruvin 79b) maintain that in addition to subordinating the ownership of his share in the courtyard, the person who did not participate in the eruv must lock the door of his home so that he will not be tempted to transgress and take articles out. He may open the door to leave, but must lock it immediately thereafter.

Rav Yosef Karo mentions this view in the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 380:1). Shulchan Aruch HaRav 380:2 states that one may rely on the Rambam's ruling. they are permitted to carry from their homes to the courtyard and from the courtyard to their homes.⁵Similarly, they may carry within the courtyard itself. The person who did not participate in the eruv may also carry within the courtyard and to and from the homes of the others, because he is considered as a guest (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 380:1). [They may not,] however, carry to the home [of this individual].

If he subordinates the ownership of his house and [of his share] of the courtyard [to the others], they are all permitted to carry. The others are permitted, because he subordinated the ownership of his house and [of his share] of the courtyard to them. He is also permitted to carry, because he no longer owns a domain. Therefore, he is considered to be [the others'] guest, and the presence of a guest does not [cause carrying] to be forbidden [in a courtyard].⁶Since the guest does not own a share of the domain, his participation or lack of participation in the eruv is of no consequence.

2. When a person subordinates the ownership of his property without specifying his intent, it is presumed that he has subordinated the ownership [of his share] of the courtyard, but not the ownership of his house. When a person subordinates the ownership of his domain, he must make an explicit statement to that effect to every inhabitant of the courtyard, saying, "My domain is subordinated to you, and to you, and to you."⁷The Turei Zahav 380:1 explains that the Rambam's intent is that if he merely said "I subordinate my domain to all of you," one might interpret his intent as "to most of you." Therefore, it is necessary to be more specific.

Rashi (Eruvin 26b) differs and maintains that it is sufficient for the person to say, "I subordinate my domain to all of you," without explicitly mentioning each person. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 380:1) mentions both opinions. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 380:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 380:5 state that one may rely on the more lenient view.

An heir may subordinate the ownership of a domain. Even when the testator dies on the Sabbath itself, the heir is empowered to act in place of the testator in all matters.⁸Although the heir would not have been able to subordinate the domain before the Sabbath began, should he consent to do so on the Sabbath itself, the eruv is acceptable. (See also Halachah 7.)

Ab initio, it is permitted to subordinate the ownership of one's domain on the Sabbath itself.⁹This ruling is the subject of a debate between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel (Eruvin 6:4). The School of Shammai maintains that subordinating one's domain is comparable to a transfer of property, and therefore requires that it be performed before the commencement of the Sabbath. The School of Hillel differs, explaining that it is considered to be merely the removal of one's authority, and hence may be performed on the Sabbath itself (Eruvin 71a).

3. [If, conversely,] those who joined in the eruv subordinate the ownership of their domain to the person who did not join, he is permitted [to carry] - for he remains the sole [owner of property] - but they are forbidden to carry, for they no longer own property. We do not say that they are considered to be his guests, because many people cannot become the guests of a single individual.¹⁰Needless to say, should one have actual guests, the fact that many guests stay in one home does not affect whether or not one is allowed to carry. When, however, we are speaking about guests merely in the halachic sense of the word, many persons are not considered the guests of one individual (Mishnah Berurah 380:18).

4. [The following rules apply when] there are two or more individuals who do not participate in the eruv: If they subordinate the ownership of their domain to those who participated in the eruv, those who participated in the eruv are permitted [to carry], and those who did not participate are not permitted [to carry].¹¹Since they did not participate in the eruv, they may not benefit from it. Nor can they be considered to be guests, for the halachic conception of a guest does not apply when more than one individual is involved. Those who participated in the eruv are not able to subordinate the ownership of their domain to the two who did not participate, because each of them causes the other to be forbidden to carry.¹²There will still be two individuals who have a share in the courtyard and are not partners in the eruv. Hence, carrying in the courtyard is forbidden.

Even if one of those who did not participate subordinates the ownership of his domain to the other person who did not participate, they are still forbidden to carry, since at the time when the others subordinated the ownership of their domain to him, he was forbidden to carry.

[When there are only two people sharing a courtyard,] and one makes an eruv, he may not subordinate the ownership of his domain to the other person who did not join in the eruv. Conversely, however, the person who did not join in the eruv can subordinate the ownership of his domain to the person who made the eruv.¹³Note the Ra'avad, who questions why the Rambam does not explain, as does Eruvin 70a, the source for this halachah, that this refers to an instance when a courtyard was shared by three people, two made an eruv, but not the third. On the Sabbath, one of the two who participated in the eruv died, and one of the two remaining desired to subordinate the ownership of his domain to his colleague.

5. Just as one homeowner can subordinate the ownership of his domain to another homeowner in a single courtyard, so too, [the inhabitants of] one courtyard can subordinate the ownership of their domain to [the inhabitants of] another courtyard.¹⁴If two adjoining courtyards open up to each other and both open up to the public domain, it is forbidden to carry from one to the other unless an eruv is made. Nevertheless, even if an eruv was not made, the inhabitants of one courtyard (A) may allow the inhabitants of the other (B) to carry within courtyard (A) by subordinating their ownership of their domain. In such an instance, the inhabitants of courtyard (A) may not carry within their domain.

These principles also apply when one courtyard leads to another, which ends in a cul-de-sac. (See the Maggid Mishneh and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 381:2.)

[After a person has subordinated his domain,] the recipient can, in turn, subordinate it [to its original owner]. What is implied? If two people are living together in a courtyard, and neither has made an eruv, the first may subordinate the ownership of his domain to his colleague, thus allowing the second colleague to carry within the domain that the first subordinated to him until he completes what he must do. Afterwards, the second colleague may subordinate ownership of the domain to the first. Indeed, this exchange may take place several times [on one Sabbath].

One may subordinate one's ownership of a ruin in the same manner in which one subordinates one's ownership of a courtyard.¹⁵The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 381:3) explain that this refers to a situation in which a ruin lies between two houses. If an eruv is not made, the two can carry in the area of the ruin by subordinating their rights to each other.

6. [The following rules apply when] a person who subordinated the ownership of his domain transfers an article to or from the domain that he subordinated: If he willingly transfers the article, his act causes the others to be forbidden [to carry],¹⁶The Magen Avraham 381:1 states that when the person subordinates the ownership of his share of the courtyard, but not his house, this restriction applies only when the person takes an article from his house to the courtyard. If he takes an article from the courtyard to his house - although he is forbidden to do so - his act does not nullify his subordination of the ownership of his property. The rationale is that since he no longer has a share in the courtyard, it can be understood that he desired to remove his property from there. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 381:1 accepts the Magen Avraham's ruling, while the Mishnah Berurah 381:3 does not. for he did not maintain his commitment.¹⁷It appears that the Rambam's intent is that by carrying, he makes it obvious that he no longer abides by his commitment to subordinate the ownership of his property. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit., which states that the reason why the others are prohibited to carry is that the person's act shows that his commitment was not genuine at the outset.) If he transfers the article unknowingly, he does not cause the others to be forbidden [to carry], for he maintained his commitment.

When does the above apply? When the others did not make use of the privilege granted them first. If, however, the others made use of the privilege granted them first,¹⁸Rashi (Eruvin 61b) states that this rule applies when, after the commencement of the Sabbath, the inhabitants of the courtyard make use of the domain that was subordinated. The Tur and others differ and maintain that even if they make use of the domain before the commencement of the Sabbath, it is acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 381:1) mentions both views, but appears to favor the Tur. Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.) and the Mishnah Berurah (381:6) state that Rashi's view should be followed. After the fact, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav maintains that we may rely on the Tur's ruling. his act does not cause the others to be forbidden [to carry],¹⁹Eruvin, loc. cit., states that Rabban Gamliel related the following incident: A Sadducee was living in the same lane as his family. One Sabbath, the Sadducee consented to subordinate the ownership of his domain. Rabban Gamliel's father told him to hurry and take some of their property out to the lane, so that the Sadducee would not be able to nullify his commitment. regardless of whether he transferred the article willingly or unknowingly.

7. When there are two houses on opposite sides of a public domain, and gentiles have surrounded [the area] with a partition on the Sabbath,²⁰As mentioned in Hilchot Shabbat 16:22, a partition erected on the Sabbath itself is considered valid and establishes an area as a private domain. Nevertheless, although according to the Torah one would be allowed to carry in this domain, it is forbidden by Rabbinic law to do so unless an eruv is established. That must be done before the commencement of the Sabbath. the owners of the homes may not subordinate the ownership of their domain to each other, because it was impossible to establish an eruv before [the commencement of] the Sabbath.²¹Accordingly, since it was forbidden to carry within this area for a portion of the Sabbath, it remains forbidden for the entire Sabbath.

[The following rules apply when] one of the inhabitants of the courtyard dies and his estate is left to someone living elsewhere: If [the owner] died before the commencement of the Sabbath, since the heir is not an inhabitant of the courtyard, he causes carrying to be forbidden.²²The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to a situation in which the original owner joined in an eruv for the Sabbath in question. If the heir lived outside the courtyard and did not participate in the eruv, he causes carrying to be forbidden, because at the commencement of the Sabbath the owner of this dwelling did not participate in the eruv.

The Maggid Mishneh also clarifies that, as reflected in Chapter 4, Halachot 1 and 6, this restriction applies only when the heir comes to dwell in the house for the Sabbath. He also notes that, as stated in Halachah 2, the heir may subordinate his ownership of the domain on the Sabbath. These rulings are quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:4). If [the owner] dies after the commencement of the Sabbath, [the presence of] the heir who is not an inhabitant of the courtyard does not cause carrying to be forbidden.²³Since it was permitted to carry for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted to carry for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).

[The following rules apply when] a person who lives outside the courtyard,²⁴And therefore did not join in the eruv of the courtyard. [but who owns a house within the courtyard] dies and leaves his domain to one of the inhabitants of the courtyard: If [the owner] died before the commencement of the Sabbath, carrying is not forbidden, because all [the inhabitants of the courtyard] participate in the eruv.²⁵The heir's participation in the eruv for the sake of his own home is also effective regarding the home that he inherits. If [the owner] dies after the commencement of the Sabbath, carrying is forbidden²⁶For the dwelling inherited by the heir was not included in the eruv at the commencement of the Sabbath. until [the heir] subordinates the ownership of the domain that he inherited to the others.

8. [The following rule applies when] a Jew and an [heirless] convert²⁷Upon the death of a convert who has not fathered any children born after his conversion, his property is ownerless and is acquired by the first Jew who takes possession of it (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:6). are dwelling in a cave, and the convert dies before the commencement of the Sabbath:²⁸Both clauses of the halachah refer to a situation in which the original Jew and the convert had made an eruv previously. If another Jew takes possession of the convert's property²⁹If, however, the convert's dwelling remains ownerless, the other individual may carry on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 271:27). - even if he does not take possession before nightfall - the person who takes possession causes carrying to be forbidden until he subordinates [the property of which he took possession], for he is considered to be an heir.³⁰Since the dwelling was ownerless at the commencement of the Sabbath, there is room for the supposition that one should be allowed to carry throughout the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since it was fit for another person to take possession of it at the commencement of the Sabbath, our Sages considered it to be a separate domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:4; Mishnah Berurah 271:28).

If the convert dies after nightfall, even if another Jew takes possession of his property, he does not cause carrying to be forbidden. Instead, the license initially granted continues.³¹For, as stated above, once an eruv is considered effective at the beginning of the Sabbath, it remains effective throughout the Sabbath, unless the fence surrounding the domain is opened.

9. When a Jew dwells together with a gentile or a resident alien³²A gentile who accepts the observance of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6; Hilchot Melachim 8:10-11). in a courtyard, the presence of the non-Jew does not cause carrying to be forbidden, for [in a halachic sense] a dwelling of a non-Jew is insignificant. His presence is like the presence of animal.

When, however, two Jews share a courtyard with a gentile, his presence causes carrying to be forbidden.³³As reflected by Chapter 5, Halachah 16, this restriction applies only when the two Jews do not share a single dwelling themselves. It is only when they would require an eruv themselves that the presence of a gentile makes it forbidden to carry. (See Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 382:1.) This is a decree so that they do not dwell together with a gentile, lest they emulate his conduct. Why was such a decree not issued regarding a single Jew and a single gentile? Because this is very uncommon,³⁴And the Sages did not institute decrees governing uncommon situations. for the Jew will fear that the gentile will [find an opportunity] to be alone together [with him] and kill him. The Sages previously forbade being alone with a gentile.³⁵See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 12:7.

10. When two Jews and a gentile live in [separate] homes in a single courtyard, and the Jews establish an eruv, their actions are of no consequence. Similarly, if they subordinate the ownership of their domain to the gentile, he subordinates the ownership of his domain to them, or one of the Jews subordinates the ownership of his domain to the other so that they are as a single aggregate [living together] with the gentile, their deeds are of no consequence.

For an eruv may not be established where a gentile is present, nor is the subordination of one's domain effective when a gentile is present. There is no alternative other than renting³⁶The Sages made renting the only alternative, because they knew that this would not be easily accepted by the gentiles. They hoped that the difficulty and inconvenience this would cause would prevent Jews from living together with gentiles. the gentile's domain,³⁷The Rashba mentions, however, that if the gentile is renting property from a Jew, it is not necessary to rent the property back from him when establishing an eruv. On the contrary, it is considered an implicit condition of the rental agreement with the gentile that his ownership not prevent the Jews from establishing an eruv. This ruling is quoted by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 382:1). so that he becomes [the Jews'] guest, as it were. Similarly, if many gentiles are present,³⁸The laws applying to the establishment of an eruv in a city inhabited by Jews and gentiles are discussed in Chapter 5, Halachah 23. they must rent their domains to the Jews, and afterwards the Jews establish an eruv.³⁹The Be'ur Halachah 382 states that the Rambam's wording implies that the sequence is significant. First, the gentile's property must be rented, and then the eruv established. If the sequence is reversed, the eruv is not effective. Nevertheless, in conclusion, he writes that with regard to practice, an eruv is acceptable even if the order was reversed. [Only then] may they carry.

When one Jew rents a gentile's domain, he may then establish an eruv with the other Jews,⁴⁰Sha'ar HaTziyun 382:31 emphasizes that it is not necessary for the individual to act as an agent for the rest of the Jews living in the courtyard. Even if he rents the gentile's property on his own initiative alone, it is sufficient. allowing them all to carry. It is not necessary for every individual to enter into a [separate] rental agreement with the gentile.

11. [The following rule applies when] there are two courtyards, one leading to the other: If a Jew and a gentile live in the inner courtyard and another Jew lives in the outer courtyard, or a Jew and a gentile live in the outer courtyard and another Jew lives in the inner courtyard, [the gentile's presence] causes carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard until [the Jews] rent his domain,⁴¹When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 382:17) mentions another instance when the same ruling applies: when the two Jews share the outer courtyard and the gentile lives in the inner courtyard alone. Since the gentile must pass through the outer courtyard, he is considered to have a share in it that must be rented. since it is used by two Jews and a gentile.⁴²Hence, it is necessary for the Jews to rent it, as reflected in the previous two halachot. [The Jew who lives] in the inner courtyard, by contrast, may carry in the inner courtyard.⁴³In this instance, either the Jew is living alone in the inner courtyard or he alone is sharing it with the gentile (in which case carrying would be permitted, as stated in Halachah 9).

12. We may enter into a rental agreement with a gentile [for this purpose] on the Sabbath itself.⁴⁴Although making business agreements including rentals is normally forbidden on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 23:12). For this rental arrangement is comparable to the subordination of a domain; [i.e.,] it is done to make a distinction and not as a [hard and fast] rental agreement. For this same reason, one may rent the gentile's domain for less than the value of a prutah.⁴⁵Regarding business agreements among Jews, a monetary value worth less than a prutah is insignificant. From Eruvin 62a, it would appear that the rationale for this ruling is that regarding business agreements among gentiles, a monetary value worth less than a prutah is significant. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:9.)

The Rambam's wording, however, suggests a second rationale - that since the agreement is more of a Rabbinic requirement than a business arrangement, an agreement which does not comply entirely with contractual law is also acceptable. The Or Sameach explains that the concept stated by the Rambam is necessary. Otherwise, the rental agreement would not be strong enough to have bearing on halachic questions involving a Jew.

A gentile's wife can rent out [his domain] without his knowledge.⁴⁶Based on Eruvin 80a, the Maggid Mishneh maintains that it is possible to rent the gentile's domain from his wife even though he himself refuses to agree to such an arrangement. Similarly, [the gentile's] hired workers or his servants can rent out [his domain] without his knowledge. [This applies even when these] hired workers or servants are Jewish.

If a person asked a gentile permission to use a place in the gentile's domain to store some of his possessions, and the gentile agreed, he is considered as being a partner in the gentile's domain. Accordingly, he may rent out [the gentile's domain on his behalf] without his knowledge.⁴⁷Eruvin 63b-64a mentions that a gentile once refused to rent out his property, and the Rabbis were able to secure permission to carry in the courtyard through such an arrangement. If a gentile has many workers, servants, or wives, it is sufficient if one rents out his domain from one of them.

13. When two Jews and a gentile are living in the same courtyard, and [only] one of the Jews rented the gentile's domain on the Sabbath, he may subordinate the ownership of his domain to the other.⁴⁸Since neither had rented the gentile's property before the commencement of the Sabbath, it was impossible for them to establish an eruv (Halachah 9). As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 21, an eruv must be established before the commencement of the Sabbath. Hence, in this instance, the only alternative is for one to subordinate the ownership of his domain to the other. [This causes carrying] to be permitted.⁴⁹More specifically, the person to whom the domain was subordinated may carry. The person who himself subordinated the domain may not carry unless his colleague subordinates his domain to him, as stated in Halachah 5. Nevertheless, what is significant about this halachah is that it shows that although carrying was forbidden in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath, it may be permitted later on. Similarly, if the gentile dies on the Sabbath, one Jew may subordinate the ownership of his domain to the other, and thus cause carrying to be permitted.

14. [The following rule applies when] one gentile rents his property to another:⁵⁰This halachah is based on actual incident that occurred concerning Resh Lakish and his student, Rabbi Chanina, when they were on a journey (Eruvin 65b). If it is impossible for the owner to evict the second gentile until the conclusion of his rental contract, we must rent [the domain] from the second gentile,⁵¹If, however, the original owner retains the right to store some of his goods on the property or use it in any way, we may rent it from him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 382:18). for he takes the place of the owner.

When, in contrast, the owner can evict the renter whenever he desires - if the renter is not present,⁵²Even if the tenant is present, the property may be rented from the original owner (Mishnah Berurah 382:62). the Jews are permitted to carry if they rent the property from its original owner.

15. [The following rules apply when] there are several Jews and a gentile living in the same courtyard, and there are windows leading from one Jew's house to another Jew's house. If they have established an eruv via the windows, and thus they are permitted to transfer articles from house to house via the windows, the gentile's presence causes them to be forbidden to transfer articles via the entrances unless they rent from him. For whenever a gentile is present, we do not consider a group of people who joined together through an eruv as a single individual.⁵³I.e., since the Jews established an eruv via the windows, it is possible to suppose that all the Jews would be considered to be a single entity. This, in turn, would cause them to be allowed to carry, as stated in Halachah 9. Nevertheless, the Rabbis did not allow for this leniency.

16. When a Jew desecrates the Sabbath publicly or worships false gods, he is considered as a gentile regarding all things.⁵⁴See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:4 and Hilchot Shabbat 30:15. As mentioned in Iggerot Moshe, Vol. III, Responsa 12, 21, and 22 (see also Be'ur Halachah 385), there are certain leniencies regarding the status of a person who publicly violates the Sabbath laws at present. Nevertheless, the overall attitude must still be one of stringency.

It must, however, be emphasized that the offspring of such Jews have a full portion in their Jewish heritage. Instead of shunning them, we must make every effort to draw them close to their spiritual roots. (See Hilchot Mamrim 3:3.) We may not include him in an eruv, nor may he subordinate the ownership of his domain. Rather, we must rent his domain⁵⁵Sefer HaKovetz and the Tzafenat Paneach state that, in contrast to a rental from a gentile, the rental fee must be equal at least to the value of a prutah. Nevertheless, the Rambam's wording does not indicate such a ruling. as [we rent the domain of] a gentile.⁵⁶At present, the eruvim established in most modern communities include many Jews whose conduct does not, as yet, reflect complete observance of the Sabbath laws. These eruvim are acceptable, because, as is explained at the conclusion of Chapter 5, they are established with the consent of the local government, which acts on behalf of all the inhabitants of the city and grants the Jewish community permission to establish an eruv.

[Different rules apply with regard] to a non-believer, one who does not worship false gods or desecrate the Sabbath - e.g., the Sadducees, the Boethusists, and all those who deny the Oral Law.⁵⁷See Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8 and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avot 1:3), which explain that Tzadok and Boethus were talented students of Antigonus of Socho. Disillusioned with their master's teachers, they started splinter groups with the intent of swaying the people from the observance of the mitzvot. When they saw the people's loyalty, they adopted a new tactic, claiming that only the Written Law was divine in origin; the Oral Law, they maintained, was a human invention. The general principle is that whoever does not acknowledge the mitzvah of an eruv may not participate in one, for he denies [its basis]. Nor may we rent his property, for he is not considered to be a gentile. The alternative is for him to subordinate the ownership of his domain to a Jew whose conduct is acceptable.

Similarly, if a Jew whose conduct is acceptable lives together with this Sadducee in a courtyard, the presence of the Sadducee causes carrying to be forbidden [in the courtyard] unless he subordinates the ownership of his domain to his colleague.