1. Although the Torah allowed carrying on a holiday even when it is not necessary [for the preparation of food], one should not carry heavy loads as he is accustomed to do on a weekday; instead, he must depart [from his regular practice].¹Rashi (Beitzah 29b) explains that this restriction applies even to foods that are necessary for the holiday. The reason for this stringency is that a person carrying large loads appears to be going about his weekday affairs without awareness of the holiday.

Rashi [cited by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 510:8)] also states that these restrictions apply only in the public domain. Within a courtyard or a home, one may carry in one's ordinary fashion. Rav Kapach explains that this is also the Rambam's view, for (although it is not explicitly stated) the entire chapter speaks about passage through the public domain. If, however, making such a departure is impossible, it is permitted.

What is implied? A person who brings jugs of wine from one place to another place should not bring them in a basket or in a container. Instead, he should carry them on his shoulder or in front of him. A person who is carrying hay should not sling the bale over his shoulder. Instead, he should carry it in his hands.

2. Similarly, loads that a person might ordinarily carry with a pole should be carried on his back. Those that are ordinarily carried on one's back should be carried on one's shoulder. And those that one usually carries on one's shoulder should be carried in one's hands before him, or a cloth should be spread over them. Similarly, one should depart from one's ordinary practice with regard to carrying loads. If it is impossible to depart from one's ordinary practice,²As an example, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 510:10) cites an instance where a person has invited many guests and must bring food for them promptly. Therefore, instead of requiring him to bring smaller loads that would take more time, he is allowed to bring a larger amount in his usual fashion. one may bring the load in the ordinary manner.

When does the above apply? When a person is carrying the burden. If, however, an animal is carrying the burden, one should not bring them at all, so that one does not follow one's weekday practice.³The Maggid Mishneh states that other opinions explain that it is forbidden to use an animal on a holiday, just as it is forbidden to do so on the Sabbath, lest one break a branch of a tree. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 495:12 accepts this view as binding.

3. We may not direct an animal with a staff, nor may a blind man go out with a cane,⁴This refers to a blind man who uses a cane to tap his way. By contrast, a person who needs a cane to walk may use a cane on a holiday (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 522:3). nor may a shepherd carry his pack.⁵Carrying a pack in this way appears as an act of disrespect for the holiday (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 522:1; Mishnah Berurah 522:2).

Neither a man nor a woman may be carried out in a chair, so that the ordinary weekday practice will not be followed. A person whose presence is required by many⁶Beitzah 25b interprets this as referring to a sage who lectures to the people. may be carried out on a chair on another person's back. Similarly, he may be carried out in a litter, even on people's shoulders.

4. We may not move a ladder used for a dovecote⁷I.e., this type of ladder is mentioned in contrast to a ladder leading to a loft, which may not be carried on Sabbaths and holidays, because it is considered a permanent part of the structure of a building and not a utensil (Hilchot Shabbat 26:7). from one dovecote to another in the public domain, lest [an observer] say, "He is moving [the ladder] to fix his roof."

It is, however, permitted to move such a ladder in a private domain. Although all the restrictions instituted by the Sages because of the impression that might be made on an onlooker normally apply even in the most private places, leniency was granted in this instance [to increase] rejoicing on the holiday.⁸The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's interpretation of Beitzah 9a. According to the Ra'avad, an even greater leniency is in place, and it is permitted to carry such a ladder even in the public domain (for the ladders used for dovecotes could be distinguished from other ladders). The Ra'avad's view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 518:4).

5. A person who has [left] produce [to dry] on his roof and who must move it from one place to another⁹E.g., he sees rain coming, which will spoil the produce (Rashi, Beitzah 35b). should not pass it from one roof to another roof - even if both roofs are of the same height - nor should he lower it by a rope from a window or carry it down a ladder. [These restrictions were instituted] so that he will not follow his ordinary practice. He may, however, throw it down through an aperture, [thus moving it] from place to place on one roof.¹⁰Our translation is based on the explanation in the D'rishah of the interpretation of the Rambam's statements provided by the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 521). The Beit Yosef maintains that the Rambam, unlike Rashi, loc. cit. and the Tur, forbids bringing the produce indoors in this manner. Others, however, interpret the Rambam's words as meaning: "One may throw them down the aperture, even though this involves moving them from place to place..."

If one slaughters an animal in a field,¹¹The Mishnah (Beitzah 3:3) mentions this law with regard to an animal that is sick and is slaughtered before it dies. The Rambam, however, explains that the law applies in all instances, even when the animal is healthy (Maggid Mishneh). one should not carry it to the city [hanging from] a small or large pole. Instead, one should carry [its meat] limb by limb.¹²Although this involves greater effort (for one will have to return to the field several times), it is preferable, so that one departs from his ordinary practice.

6. On a holiday it is permitted to send a colleague¹³As the Ramah (Orach Chayim 516:3) emphasizes, it is permissible to send these presents in the public domain. For since sending and receiving these articles increases one's festive joy, there is no prohibition against their transfer. any article from which one could benefit on a weekday, even though one cannot benefit from it on a holiday - e.g., tefillin. Needless to say, one may send [a colleague] articles from which one may benefit on the holiday itself - e.g., wine, oil, and fine flour.¹⁴See the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which permits sending clothing, although it is unfinished, provided it is fit to use for some purpose in its present state.

When, however, one could not derive benefit from an article on a weekday unless one performed a task whose performance is forbidden on a holiday, one may not send that article to a colleague on a holiday.¹⁵According to the Rambam, it would appear that the reason for this prohibition is not that it involves the forbidden labor of transferring articles, since, as he states in Chapter 1, Halachah 4, this activity is permitted even when no benefit can be derived on the holiday itself. Rather, the reason is - as in the previous halachot - so that one will not conduct oneself in a weekday manner on a holiday.

Significantly, the Magen Avraham 516:1 and the Turei Zahav 516:1 associate this prohibition with the forbidden labor of transferring articles. Therefore, they explain, when a city has an eruv constructed, it is permitted to send such articles on a holiday as well. (See the discussion of this law in the Mishnah Berurah 516:4.)

[Significantly, in Hilchot Eruvin 8:4, the Rambam mentions the establishment of an eruv t'chumim on a holiday, but he does not mention the establishment of an eruv chatzerot on a holiday at all.]

7. What is implied? One may not send grain, because one does not benefit from it on a weekday unless one grinds it,¹⁶There are certain people who eat roasted grains. Therefore, there is a minority opinion in Beitzah 14b that allows grain to be sent on a holiday. Nevertheless, since this is not a widely prevalent practice, this view was not accepted by the majority of Sages. and it is forbidden to grind on a holiday. We may, by contrast, send legumes, since one may cook them on a holiday or roast them, and eat them.

We may send a beast, a domestic animal, or a fowl on a holiday even when alive, because it is permitted to slaughter them on a holiday.¹⁷This leniency applies even when one knows that the recipient will not slaughter them on the holiday (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 516:1; Mishnah Berurah 516:1). The same rules apply in other similar situations.

8. When one sends a colleague as a present any article that is permitted to be sent on a holiday, one should not send it with a delegation.¹⁸Since this prohibition was instituted as an expression of respect for the holiday, it applies even in a courtyard and a private domain if there are many people there (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 516:6; Mishnah Berurah 516:6). A delegation includes at least three people.

What is implied? When one sends a colleague animals or wines with a group of three people who walk together, or four who walk one after the other, and they all walk in a single line,¹⁹The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 516:2) uses slightly different wording: "Three people or more, one after the other." There are versions of the Mishneh Torah which also use such wording. this is forbidden, so that one does not follow one's weekday procedure.²⁰Rashi (Beitzah 14b) states that by sending the articles in this manner, it appears that one is taking them to the market to be sold.It is permitted, however, to send three different types [of articles] with three people who walk together.

9. When a person establishes an eruv t'chumim for a holiday, his animal, his articles, and his produce are bound by the same restrictions as he is.²¹A person is forbidden to proceed more than 2000 cubits in any direction from his location at the onset of the Sabbath or a holiday. If he is in a private domain or in an enclosed city, the 2000-cubit limit begins from that area's peripheries.

Our Sages offered an additional leniency: a person can establish a location within his Sabbath limits as his place for the Sabbath or a holiday by depositing food at that location before the onset of the Sabbath or the holiday. This is referred to as an eruv t'chumim. In this instance, his 2000-cubit limits are calculated from that place, and not from the place where he is located at the onset of the Sabbath.

In this halachah, the Rambam is stating that the restriction against proceeding beyond 2000 cubits applies not only to the person himself, but to the possessions he owns. For them as well, the 2000-cubit limit is calculated from the location of the food he deposited.

[The Rambam does not mention this concept with regard to the Sabbath, since it is forbidden to carry articles or to lead an animal on that day. There are, nevertheless, ramifications of this law with regard to the Sabbath. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 305:23) states that it is permitted to entrust one's animals to a gentile shepherd to watch, even though one knows that he will lead them beyond the Sabbath limits. The commentaries explain that since the Jew himself neither performs nor initiates the activity, there is no prohibition.] They also may not be taken beyond two thousand cubits in all directions from the place where the person established his eruv.

10. [The holiday limits] of ownerless articles follow the limits of those who acquire them.²²I.e., they may be carried within a 2000-cubit radius beginning from the place where the person who acquires them was located at the commencement of the Sabbath, or from the place where he deposited his eruv t'chumim.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this point and maintains that the Sabbath limits are calculated from the place where the article itself was located at the commencement of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, the later authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 401:1), follow the Rambam's view. [The holiday limits] of articles belonging to a gentile are determined by their place [at the commencement of the holiday]. They are granted [only] two thousand cubits in all directions from this place.²³For this reason, our Sages placed several restrictions on benefitting from articles brought by gentiles on a holiday, lest they have brought them from beyond the holiday limits. This is a decree. [Our Sages placed restrictions on articles] belonging to gentiles, because of articles belonging to Jews.

When produce was taken beyond [the holiday limits] and returned - even if this was done with a conscious intent to violate the prohibitions involved - there is no prohibition against moving it throughout [the holiday limits]. It is considered analogous to a person who was forcibly taken beyond [the holiday limits] and forcibly returned.²⁴A person who left his Sabbath or holiday limits and returned is allowed to walk only within a square of four cubits by four cubits (Hilchot Shabbat 27:12-13). These restrictions are not placed on a utensil. A person is capable of acting on his own initiative, while a utensil must be carried by a person. It is thus comparable to a person who was taken from and returned to his Sabbath limits by force. As stated in Hilchot Shabbat (ibid.), it is considered as if he had never departed. Nevertheless, as reflected in Hilchot Shabbat 6:24, if the produce was taken from the city by a Jew with a conscious intent to violate the law, one should not benefit from it on the holiday.

11. When a person entrusts an animal to his son, [the holiday limits] of the animal follow those of the father.²⁵Because the father does not expect his son to take responsibility for the animal, it is not considered as having entered the son's possession (Maggid Mishneh). Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 397:4) follows the Rambam's ruling, there are later authorities who differ. (See Mishnah Berurah 397:10.) If he entrusts [an animal] to a shepherd, even if he gives it to him on a holiday,²⁶The Mishnah Berurah 397:12 explains that the rationale is that we assume that even before the commencement of the holiday he had the intention of entrusting it to the shepherd. As the Mishnah Berurah mentions, other authorities differ with this ruling when there is more than one shepherd in a city and the owner does not also entrust his sheep to the same one, because it is not clear - even in the owner's mind - to which shepherd he will entrust his animal. its [holiday limits] follow those of the shepherd. If he entrusts it to two shepherds, its [holiday limits] follow those of the owner, since neither acquired [responsibility for it beforehand].²⁷In this instance as well, although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:5) quotes the Rambam's ruling, many later authorities differ. They maintain that this applies only when a person entrusted the animal to the shepherds on the holiday. If he entrusted it to them before the holiday, they are responsible, and the animal may be taken only within an area in which they both may walk (Mishnah Berurah 397:13).

12. When a person invites guests on a holiday, [the guests] should not carry the portions [of food they were given] to a place where their host may not go himself. For the [holiday limits] of [the food served at] the feast depend on those of the host, and not on those of the guests.²⁸Since the food belonged to the host at the beginning of the holiday, the holiday limits in which it may be carried are dependent on him. Although he gives the guests permission to take portions of the food home, they may not take the food beyond the limits in which it could originally be carried. [These restrictions apply] unless [the host] granted [the guests] their portions [as presents via] another individual²⁹I.e., he must give another person the portions of food, and he will acquire them on behalf of each of the guests (Rashi, Beitzah 40a). before the commencement of the holiday.

13. Similarly, when produce belonging to a person was left in another city for safekeeping, and the inhabitants of that city established an eruv [t'chumim] so that they could visit [the owner], they should not bring him his produce. For his produce [is governed by the same laws] as he is,³⁰And he did not establish an eruv. even though it was [entrusted] to people who established an eruv [t'chumim].

When does the above apply? When the people to whom the produce was entrusted have designated a corner of their property for it.³¹In such an instance, it is as if that corner were loaned to the owner of the produce. The people to whom the article was entrusted, however, are not held responsible for it. Therefore, the status of the produce depends on the owner. If, however, they did not designate [a place for the produce], its [holiday limits] follow those of the people to whom it was entrusted.³²For they are responsible for the article.

14. [The holiday limits of the water in] a cistern belonging to one person follow those of the owner.³³I.e., the water may be brought only to a place to which the owner of the cistern is permitted to proceed. If a cistern is owned by a city, [the holiday limits of its water] follow those of the inhabitants of the city.³⁴The Mishnah Berurah 397:34 interprets this as follows: If an inhabitant of the city draws the water, he may carry it as far as he is permitted to proceed himself, even if he extended his holiday limits by establishing an eruv t'chumim. If a person who does not live in the city draws the water, he may carry it only within the city itself. [The holiday limits of the water in a cistern made] for the festive pilgrims coming from Babylon, which is donated to the public at large, follow those of the person who draws the water.³⁵Since the water is left for all travelers without distinction, its status is comparable to that of the ownerless articles mentioned in Halachah 10. (For that reason, the Ra'avad, who raises an objection to that halachah, also objects here.) Whoever draws water may carry it wherever he is allowed to proceed.

[The holiday limits of the water in] springs that flow freely follow those of all people.³⁶Seemingly, the intent of the latter phrase is the same as "those of the person who draws the water." [Indeed, Rabbenu Asher and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 397:15) use the phrase, "those of the person who draws the water."] One wonders why the Rambam uses different wording. Even if [the water] flows from outside the [holiday] limits within those limits, we may draw water from [such springs] on the Sabbath.³⁷Since the water continuously flows and does not stay in a single place, there is no place that is considered to have been established as its "place" for the Sabbath or holiday. Needless to say, this is permitted on a holiday.

15. [The holiday limits of] an ox belonging to a herder follow those of the inhabitants of his city.³⁸The herder raises oxen for slaughter. Nevertheless, the oxen he raises are not unique, and he cannot expect them to attract the attention of people beyond his immediate area. For that reason, their holiday limits are confined to those of their owner's town. [The holiday limits of] an ox fattened for slaughter follow those of the person who purchased it with the intention of slaughtering it on the holiday [even if he lives outside the city]. [This leniency was granted] because the fact that it was fattened for slaughter makes its reputation well known, and many come to purchase it [even from afar].

Similarly, if the owner slaughtered [such an ox] on a holiday and sold its meat [to many different people], each of the purchasers may bring the meat to any place where he is allowed to proceed himself. [The reason for this leniency is] that on the day before the holiday, [the ox's] owner had the intent that people from [surrounding] villages would purchase [its meat]. Therefore, this ox is comparable to a well designated for festive pilgrims, [the water of] which is provided to the public at large.

16. [The holiday limits of] a coal follow those of its owners,³⁹A coal is considered to be an object with substance. Therefore, the laws that govern all other articles pertain to it as well. and not those of a person who borrows it. [Those of] a flame, by contrast, follow those of the person carrying it.⁴⁰For a flame, by contrast, has no substance, and is therefore not considered to be an article that belongs to a person and is subject to his holiday limits. Therefore, a person who lights a lamp or a piece of wood [from] a colleague's [flame] may carry it to any place where he is permitted to proceed himself.

17. When on the day prior to a holiday, a person [secures] a colleague's [consent] to lend him a utensil, [on the holiday, the holiday limits of] the utensil follow those of the borrower, even when [the owner] did not give him the utensil until [after the commencement of] the holiday.⁴¹A borrower does not become responsible for an object until he performs a formal kinyan (contractual act). Nevertheless, since the owner consented to give the borrower the article before the commencement of the holiday, with regard to the law at hand it is considered as if it were already in the borrower's possession (Mishnah Berurah 397:26).

When a person borrows a utensil on the holiday, even if he always borrows this utensil from [its owner] on a holiday, [the holiday limits of the utensil] follow those of the owner.⁴²It is at the commencement of the holiday that the holiday limits of a utensil are established. Since the owner did not consent to give the utensil to the borrower before this time, the utensil's limits still depend on its owner. The fact that he frequently lends the article to the borrower is of no halachic significance. Since the borrower did not ask for the article before the holiday began, the owner could have assumed that he had found another person from whom to borrow it.

18. When [before a holiday commences] two people both [arrange to] borrow the same cloak [from a person on the holiday], one [asks] to borrow it on the morning and the other [asks] to borrow it towards evening, [the holiday limits] of this [cloak] are dependent on those of both borrowers.⁴³Since the owner of the cloak agreed to let both of the borrowers use it before the holiday began, they both figure in the determination of the holiday limits of the cloak. They may not bring it to a place other than one to which they both may proceed.

19. What is implied? If the first established an eruv [t'chumim] that was one thousand cubits to the east of the cloak, and the other established an eruv that was five hundred cubits to the west of the cloak, when the first person takes the cloak he may move it no more than one thousand five hundred cubits to the east of the cloak's present location. For this is the end of the holiday limits to which the person who established his eruv to the west may proceed.

When the second person takes the cloak, he may move it no more than one thousand cubits to the west of the cloak's present location. For this is the end of the holiday limits to which the person who established his eruv to the east may proceed.

Based on the above, if one person established his eruv two thousand cubits to the east of the cloak and the other established his eruv two thousand cubits to the west [of the cloak], they may not move it from its place.⁴⁴For by moving it to either direction, one will be taking it beyond the holiday limits of one of the people to whom it is entrusted.

20. Similarly, when a woman borrows water or salt from a friend to use in the kneading of dough or in the preparation of food, [the holiday limits of] the dough or the food are dependent on those of both women.⁴⁵Since the ingredients belonged to both women at the commencement of the holiday, the holiday limits of the dough or the food made from them are dependent on those of both women.

By the same token, if two people purchased an animal in partnership and slaughtered it on a holiday, [the holiday limits of] the meat are dependent on those of both [partners]. If, by contrast, they purchased a jug [of wine] in partnership, and divided it on the holiday, [the holiday limits of] each partner's portion follow those of [its owner].

[What is the difference between these two laws? In the latter instance,] since the [prohibition against going beyond the holiday] limits is Rabbinic in origin,⁴⁶In Hilchot Shabbat, Chapter 27, the Rambam explains that the concept of Sabbath limits has its origins in the Torah itself. Nevertheless, according to the Torah, it is permitted to proceed twelve mil from one's place. The restriction of two thousand cubits is Rabbinic in origin. the principle of b'reirah applies. Thus, it is considered as if the portion that is given to [either partner] were distinct and separated as his in the jug before the holiday; [i.e.,] it is as if [the two portions of wine] were not mixed with [the other].⁴⁷Therefore, each of the partners is allowed to take his portion with him throughout his own holiday limits without worrying about his partner's circumstances.

This cannot be said with regard to an animal. Even if the portion that was given to [either partner] were considered to be separated within the animal, and it is as if it were distinct [leniency cannot be shown in this instance]. For the portion derived nurture from the portion belonging to the other colleague while the animal was alive, since all of an animal's limbs derive nurture from each other. Thus, all the animal's limbs are considered as being intermingled with the portions belonging to both partners. Therefore, [the holiday limits of the animal] are dependent on both of them.⁴⁸This represents the opinion of Rav (Beitzah 37b). The Talmud, however, records the opinion of other Sages who differ and maintain that there is no difference between the laws pertaining to an animal and those pertaining to wine.

In the debate concerning this manner, two of the other Sages, Rav Kahana and Rav Assi, asked Rav: There is another relevant prohibition, that of muktzeh, for each of the partners diverted his attention from the portion designated for the other. Nevertheless, although the portions of meat belonging to each of the partners derived nurture from each other, none of the Sages thought of applying the prohibition of muktzeh for that reason.

Rav did not reply. This has led some authorities (see the gloss of Rav Moshe HaCohen, Tur, Orach Chayim 397) to the conclusion that Rav conceded and retracted his position. According to these views, the meat belonging to each partner may be taken throughout his holiday limits. Others (including the Rambam) maintain that Rav's inability to reply at that time does not represent a retraction of his position. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 397:10) follows the Rambam's ruling. Nevertheless, the Be'ur Halachah 397 states that if there is a necessity, it is possible to rely on the more lenient view.